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we should not underestimate the difficulties for the Chinese in
agreeing to a prolongation of British rule, since at the time
envisaged they are very likely to be a highly nationalistic and
revolutionary Government. The Chinese Government may well take
the view in 1997, when they will be presented with a clear-cut choice,
that for reasons of national prestige and to safeguard their claims
to be in the forefront of anti-colonialism they must reclaim the
Colony, despite the economic benefits which would then be denied
to them.
7. There is, however, a remote chance that the Chinese might be
prepared to see Hong Kong remain under our administration, thus
enabling them to continue to enjoy the fruits of its Colonial
status. At this point in time it would be extremely rash to plan
solely on the assumption that the Chinese might renew the present
lease or negotiate a contractual agreement for lease on new terms,
since this could present the Chinese with unacceptable difficulties
in terms of ideology and national prestige. However we are
considering a situation many years from now and we should not wholly
exclude the possibility that the Chinese might be prepared to give
us a tacit and private indication that over an indefinite period
they did not propose to reclaim the Colony. But the public uncer-
tainty surrounding such a situation could have an unsettling effect
on Hong Kong public morale and business confidence, and might well
put the Colony in difficulties. A tacit and private indication on
these lines from the Chinese might moreover be coupled with an
attempt to enforce a Macao-style solution on us, though in view of
our successful resistance to pressure in 1967, the Chinese could
hardly expect to get away with this tactic very easily.
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18.