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Mr. D. R. Rajagopal (National Herald): How hopeful are you, Sir, of Britain achieving an Anglo-Soviet joint initiative in Indo-China?
And what are your assessments of the dimensions of the conflict in Cambodia? And how hopeful are you of restoring security, sanity and peace in the disturbed conditions of Asia?
Mr. Stewart: I do regard what is happening in Cambodia as very serious indeed. It is very much our view, Britain's view as one of the co-Chairmen of the conference, that the conference ought to be reconvened. I understand Mr. Malik has made a statement about this recently, but I am afraid I have not been able to get reliable information as to exactly what the contents of that statement were. But for our part, we should like to see the conference reconvened, and a peaceful solution found.
Mr. Rajagopal: After the arms supply to Nigeria, how was it that your Foreign Office spokesman said "We cannot supply arms to Cambodia?”
Mr. Stewart: We are in a very different position there, you see. We are after all one of the co-Chairmen of the conference and for that reason we do not think it would be suitable for us to supply arms here. Nigeria, of course, is a Commonwealth country, one of whose traditional suppliers we were.
Mr. Andrew Tilley (RTV): On the subject of Indo-China in view of the troubles in Laos and Cambodia do you not think that it would be wise for Britain to reconsider her decision on withdrawal from East of Suez?
Mr. Stewart: I do not think we either can or ought to reconsider our decision about withdrawal from the Far East. I doubt very much if anybody would have said even if that decision had not been made, that we ought to have got involved in the actual fighting in South-East Asia.
Mr. Tilley: It is said that Britain's policy is to come back to South-East Asia when and if trouble occurs rather than to remain there. Will this act as a deterrent on the aggressors?
Mr. Stewart: Well, I think our policy can be more accurately described as this: we are not going to maintain the military presence East of Suez we used to maintain. We have decided to bring that to an end by the end of 1971. Now, although there might be some arguments as to the exact date, I do not think there is any doubt that that decision would have had to have been taken sooner or later, without very much difference as to the exact time you put to it. We were shouldering responsibilities in the world that no other country of our size and resources would have attempted to shoulder. We have said, of course, that we shall retain a general capability, and could in certain circumstances intervene in Far Eastern affairs, but we are not under a commitment to do so.
Mr. Samir Karam (United Arab Broadcasting Service): I understood that you said to a daily in Hong Kong that you are convinced now that it is impossible to get the Arabs and the Israelis together in direct negotiations. Does this mean the British Government is now convinced that the Israeli withdrawal should come first to implement the United Nations Security Council's Resolution?
Mr. Stewart: What I have said quite often is that I do believe it would be a good thing if we could have direct negotiations, but since it is clear that the Arab countries have extremely strong objections to this, we must therefore try and find some other way, through the mediation of Dr. Jarring, through any possibility that may be open. That is to say, while I believe there will be advantage in direct negotiations, I do not think it is any good saying that if there is not to be direct negotiations, there is not to be anything. We must try and find another
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