NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
The
more
aggressive of the Unofficial members can be expected to make much
This latter point. The less aggresive
are
likely to arout it; resting their case on The need to show my
confidence in the future of Hong Kong.
eontribution (1966), devaluation (1967), the import deposit scheme (1968) and the decision to impose a tariff on cotton textile imports from the Commonwealth (1969). Our actions are seen as showing a lack of concern for Hong Kong's interests and for her special problems; as
indicating an indifference to the special ties and relationships which should subsist between a
Colony and the responsible power.
This require's the occasional
There is accordingly a political need for
gestures which demonstrates our concern for and confidence in Hong Kong.
+
Assistance for this
project would be a most suitable and appropriate gesture, particularly since we have such a strong interest of our own in it. Our failure to
contribute to it can be expected to increase pressure from Hong Kong for a greater say in the control of traffic rights, Hong Kong's argument being that if it is to shoulder the burden öf
financing the airport it must be allowed to maximise use and revenues.
56.
Because Hong Kong is U.K. territory, H.M.G. is responsible for Hong Kong civil aviation'
matters in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). We dispose of traffic
rights at Kai Tak, Those rights are a major card
in our hands in the complex of air services negotiations with all countries having 'major civil aviation interests. Their value is estimated at £20 million per annum in terms of gross passenger revenue; rights of approximately equivalent value have been obtained for British airlines elsewhere
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