arce for expenditure in aid of British aviation
interests.
Board of Trade votes have been effectively
pruned in past exercises to contain government expendi-
ture and there is no money to spare for additional
even a minor allocation, it is claimed,
projects;
could only be found at the expense of aviation
development in the U.K. Other quasi or non-govern-
mental sources have been explored without result.
3. On financial grounds Hong Kong's case for seeking
assistance is weak. Government reserves at about £80
million are considerable (although there will be many
heavy calls on these in the years ahead); Government
revenue continues to be buoyant, throwing up a steady
succession of budget surpluses. The case for assist-
癟
ance must rest largely on political grounds and on
meeting the strong public feeling in Hong Kong that the
U.K. has an obligation to share in the cost of maintain
ing an airport from which British aviation interests
derive substantial benefit and where the traffic rights
are controlled by H.M.G. in those interests.
also
4. The political case/rests on the need to counteract
the feeling in Hong Kong that has been growing for
some years now that Britain regards the Colony as a
(See Brist No. 13A).
་
nuisance and an impediment t/ We left Hong Kong to
grapple alone (without significant financial assistance
in the post-war years with the tremendous problems posed
by the influx of refugees from China. At the same time
we are seen as having dealt the Colony a series of blows
to its trade and financest the restrictions on its
exports of cotton textiles to this country since 1959,
the import surcharge (1964), the "carry-over" (of textile
quotas) controversy (1965), the increase in the defence
./contribucion
Continued at-✶ overleaf
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