d.
SECRET UK EYES ONLY
ANNEX B TO
DOP 535/70 (Final)
Continued)
40 Cdo Gp embarks in an LPH in November 1971 and moves
to cover the Gulf withdrawal.
If not required for this task
it would move direct to UK.
4.
This compromise plan does not meet all CINCFE's requirements
and would create some unavoidable administrative problems in FEC.
However, it would reduce turbulence for 40 Cdo, would allow
sufficient time for the UK permanent presence to be firmly established
and would be the most practicable method of providing a covering
force for the Gulf, if one is required in December 1971. On balance
we consider it to be the best plan in the circumstances.
5.
The
In view of a certain disillusionment which we are advised has
been growing in Malaysia and Singapore about the value to them of future
Five Power defence arrangements as a whole, and of the UK's part in
them, it is possible that negotiations on these matters could prove
difficult. In these circumstances, we are advised that a proposal to
reduce more quickly towards the eventual force level of one battalion
group would tend to reinforce any feelings of disillusionment.
question of the timing of an announcement of our intention to accelerate
the rundown is, therefore, of considerable political importance.
6. We agree with CINCFE's view that if the proposed move of units
is to start in April 1971, the necessary preparations, including
informin the personnel concerned must not be delayed beyond January
1971 at the latest, and hence the Singapore and Malaysian
Governments would have to be informed by that date. We are advised
that this would necessitate informing them at the Five Power Official
Meeting, which it is hoped will take place in December 1970. However,
it would be inadvisable to take a firm decision on this now, because
if conditions at the meeting proved unfavourable, an approach to
B
SECRET
نے
UK EYES ONLY