SECRET UK EYES ONLY
ANNEX A TO
DOP 535/70 (Final) (Continued
Political Aspects
14. There is a considerable amount of work to be done on a number of problems concerning the establishment of viable Five Power defence arrangements in the Malaysia/Singapore area by the end of 1971. Some of these could prove difficult to negotiate, especially as we are advised that political reports from Kuala Lumpur and Singapore indicete a greater tendency than hitherto for both countries to pursue an independent line. The High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur detects growing feelings of disillusionment and scepticism about what the Five Power arrangements as a whole, and the UK's part in them are going to mean in practical terms in Malaysia. Singapore has not only been thinking about increasing her own capa- bility by the purchase of supersonic aircraft, but also about re- insuring elsewhere by discussing with the Russians the provision of facilities for Soviet ships. In these circumstances, we are advised that a proposal to approach the eventual force level of one battalion group more quickly would tend to reinforce any feelings about the modesty of our contriution and so could make negotiations on Five Power arrangements generally more difficult. The question of the timing of an announcement of our intention to accelerate the rundown is therefore of considerable political importance. e must ensure that we do not aga to the difficulties of what could already be difficult negotiations.
15. We agree with CINCFE's view that if the proposed move of units is to start in April 1971, the necessary preparations, including informing the personnel concerned must not be delayed beyond January 1971 at the latest, and hence the Singapore and Balaysian Governments would have to be informed by that date. We are advised that this would necessitate informing them at the Five Power Official Meeting, which it is hoped will take place in December 1970. However, it would be inadvisable to take a firm decision on this now, because if conditions at the meeting proved unfavourable, an approach to the Malaysians and Singaporeans would have to be delayed. In that event it would be very unlikely that an approach could be made until after the Five Power Ministerial Meeting planned for about April 1971, and the opportunity of modifying the rundown in the way we should like would thus have to be foregone.
CONCLUSIONS
16. We conclude that:
a.
From the military point of view CINCFE's proposal to withdraw A Syn 14/20 H and 3 Cao Rde Gp, less 40 Cdo Gp, from 1 April 1971 is acceptable. flowever, this would be subject to sufficient progress being made on Five Power Defence arrangements generally at the Five Power Official Meeting in December 1970, to enable the Malaysian and Singapore Governments to be informed at that time of the UK intention of modifying the rundown.
A
4
SECRET UK EYES ONLY