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SECRET UK EYES ONLY
ANNEX A TO
DOP 535/70 (Final)
(Continued)
become the first unit of the continued UK presence. Roth these solutions would create administrative problems in FLC. In addition, the many advantages would be lost of having a UK infantry battalion firmly established in Singapore, preferably as part of the ANZUK brigade, before final withdrawal.
9.
Gulf Covering Force. It is still necessary to plan on a force being required to cover the Gulf withdrawal in December 1971. Although CINCFE has recommended that his original proposal (5) to cover the Gulf withdrawal with one commando group from Singapore should not be pursued, we consider that this commitment could best be met by a Far East commando. This would necessitate retaining a commando group in Singapore until November 1971, when it would move in an LPH to the Gulf.
Compromise Solution
10.
Taking into account CINCF's proposals and the problems referred to above, a compromise solution would be:
a.
A Sqn 14/20 and 3 Cdo Fde Gp, less 40 Cdo Gp, start withdrawing from 1 April 1971 as suggested by CINCFE.
b. A UK battalion group arrives in Singapore during the first 2 weeks of September 1971.
1/2 CR moves to Hong Kong in September 1971 as suggested by CINCFE.
C.
d.
40 Cdo Gp embarks in an LPH in November 1971 to cover the Gulf withdrawal. If not required for this task, it could be flown direct to UK in early November 1971, which is the earliest acceptable date for its arrival there.
11. This compromise plan would not entirely meet CINCFE's requirements and would create a number of administrative problems in FEC. However, it would considerably reduce turbulence for 40 Cão, would allow sufficient time for the future UK presence to be firmly established and would provide the most practicable method of covering the Gulf withdrawal in December 1971. On balance we consider it to be the Lest plan available in the circumstances.
12. The net savings in implementing this plan, as opposed to the original Far East rundown plan (2) have been estimated as £MO.5 budgetary and M1.35 in overseas expenditure.
13. CINCFE would be required to make alternative arrangements for the command of LC Cdo Gp and the incoming UK battalion after the withdrawal of HQ 3 Cdo Rde Gp.
Notes:
2. CINCFE 7/68 (A) (Second Revise) (including Amendment No 2)
CINCFE 14/20 dated 11 May 1970
5.
A
3
SECRET UK EYES ONLY