Reference..

the three Services despite the earlier withdrawal of the battalion, the grounds of Maltese objection would be very much less. Probably only the Services in Malta would be able to assess whether this could be done. In any re- phasing of the plan it would also be most important to abide by the accepted convention in Malta of giving at least six months' notice on redundancies. Any departure from the established discharge programme is likely to create serious difficulties with the Maltese Government and the General Workers Union.

3.

An alternative possibility that has been suggested by the High Commission is that of temporary withdrawal of the battalion for service in Northern Ireland on the analogy of e.g. past exercises in Libya or Cyprus and its return to Malt before its final withdrawal. This arrangement would from the Maltese point of view be distinctly preferable as it would not affect the rundown programme and would therefore be free of political difficulties. The practicability of borrowing a battalion which has less than a year to serve in Malta may, of course, be limited but it is conceivable that you could leave both battalions there longer than now planned and detach one of them to Northern Ireland if this helped your over-stretch problems, or you could leave both as at present planned and borrow the second.

Cyprus

4.

The UNFICYP military appreciation is that UNFICYP cannot be reduced in strength until there has been substantial progress in deconfrontation. The Ministry of Defence have

long pressed the view, with COS support, that UNFICYP is about as small as it could be in present circumstances if it were to remain a viable military force. If we withdrew our battalion the UNFICYP Force Commander would either have to manage with inadequate forces or seek a replacement for the British contingent. The withdrawal of our only military contribution to the military peacekeeping task would, I suspect, be difficult in domestic political terms; it would be out of keeping with our international support for UNFICYP, which we have often urged on other governments and, locally, in the High Commissioner's view, the precipitate withdrawal of the British battalion would dent our prestige badly. short, the High Commissioner's view is that "the risk of serious damage to our international standing, plus our prestige in Cyprus and our relations with the Turks, is so great that I would strongly advise against". ・

In

CONFIDENTIAL

FINEON ITLA I

15.

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