Part I to Cos 25th Meeting/70 4 August 1970
that they should decide now to relieve '45 Commando RM by 41 Commando RM in late August, that they should be prepared to retain 1 GREEN HOWARDS though the decision on this could be taken later and at short notice, and that they should be prepared for the necessity of relieving 1 DEVON and DORSET by a further battalion from BAOR.
3.
SIR PETER HILL-NORTON said that he had much sympathy for the Army Department in the extremely difficult situation that faced them. He was particularly concerned however to avoid dealing with it in an ad hoc way, and believed they should also consider the situation that would obtain if the hoped for easement in November did not materialise. He would emphasise the penalties of relieving 45 Commando RM by 41 Commando RM that were outlined in the paper (1). It was not a matter of domestic problems; such a relief would involve
cancelling their participation in DEEP EXPRESS which was the only NATO exercise on the Southern Flank in which the United Kingdom Amphibious Forces were scheduled to participate during a period of three years. Such a cancellation would have to be notified to SACEUR. If a Royal Marine Commando had to be kept in Northern Ireland, he did not rule out the possibility of giving up the Arctic training planned to take place on the Northern Flank, instead of giving up the Southern Flank exercise. They should, however, be aware of the
eventual possibility and jumplications of having to give up both. This he believed would be as damaging to NATO as the withdrawal of more troops from BAOR. He suggested, however, that there might be other options open to them in the form of withdrawing units temporarily from other overseas garrisons. In particular should they not consider the possibility of relieving the Royal Marine Commando in
Hong Kong by a Gurkha battalion from Singapore so that the former could be brought back for a period of say three or four months? He mentioned this possibility in the knowledge that such a course would have implications on the disposition of British troops in Singapore and Hong Kong which would need further examination.
Lt. MR KILLICK (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) said that if there was time to consider other options such as had been mentioned they could certainly do so. But as far as the options presented in the paper (1) before them were concerned, it was the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that the
Note:
1.
COS (Misc) 129/31/7/70.
2
SECRET
UK EYES ONLY
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