SECRET
UK EYES ONLY
DOP Note 706/70 (Draft) (Continued)
late to relieve 1 D and D by 10 September but could relieve either
1 Green Howards or 41 Cdo RM.
37. The advantage of relieving 41 Cão RM would be to enable
them to fulfil their planned NATO deployment to the Mediterranean
in HMS ALBION and to take part in Exercise DEEP EXPRESS. On
the other hand there are strong political and military reasons for
returning 1 Green Howards to BAOR as soon as possible.
38.
By mid-September, 1 Green Howards will already have completed almost
3 months in Northern Ireland, leaving just over one month to
complete its tour. In these circumstances we consider that it
would be less damaging to our relationship with NATO to leave
1 Green Howards in Northern Ireland until 29 October 1970 than
to be forced to make a surprise announcement, and at short notice,
of the withdrawal of the RM commando from Exercise DEEP
EXPRESS.
CONCLUSIONS
39.
It is concluded that:
a. It is not acceptable to make any reduction in
the force levels in Berlin, Cyprus, Hong Kong,
British Honduras, Brunei, Anguilla and Antigua.
b.
It is not feasible to provide a unit from other
world-wide deployments outside UK and BAOR in time
to enable 1 D and D to return to Malta on 10
September 1970.
c.
It might be politically acceptable for Malta to be
without any infantry unit for a short time, but for
A
12
C
SECRET
UK EYES ONLY