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ENCLOSURE 1 TO COS 1578/22/9/70 (Continued)
be needed, not 6 as assumed in the previous note. However since the Governor of Hong Kong (4) is concerned at the balance between British and Gurkha forces and considers that there ought to be 3 1/3 major British units (2 battalions, one artillery regiment and one armoured car squadron), in the Colony, the change in force levels will be implemented by a reduction in the number of Gurkha battalions which need to be based in Hong Kong. The change will not therefore release a British battalion for service elsewhere. As regards the Gulf, it now seems less likely that HMG will decide in favour of deploying a battalion to that area.
5. On the other hand now that future commitments in Singapore and Brunei are becoming firmer, the minimum figure of 51 battalions in the previous paper is becoming increasingly unrealistic. Moreover that figure was based on an optimistic assumption that Northern Ireland would need only a total of 5 battalions whereas, at a recent meeting (5), the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the emergency in Northern Ireland was likely to continue to require about 10 battalions in the foreseeable future. On this basis the conclusion of the previous note that "at least 51 battalions" would be needed has been overtaken. The revised forecast infantry commitments is summarised at Annex A. They total 57 battalions.
6. On the basis of these increased requirements therefore, the previous conclusion in favour of retaining 5 Gurkha battalions to supplement 46 British infantry battalions remains as valid as ever. But since there will be only 3 Gurkha battalions in Hong Kong and one in Brunei, and since it is unlikely to be acceptable (6) that the single UK battalion in Singapore should be other than British, it will be necessary for the fifth Gurkha battalion to be deployed to the United Kingdom. It could then be available to assume the role of reinforcement battalion for Hong Kong at 7 days notice and also to carry out a variety of tasks which would otherwise fall to British infantry battalions serving in the UK. This would ease to some extent the serious burden of overstretch on British battalions at the present time, and give a measure of extra flexibility to the programme for reinforcing Northern Ireland. A Gurkha battalion in the United Kingdom could not, for political reasons, be used in Northern Ireland.
7.
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Any contribution to the easing of the problem of overstretch in the Infantry must be accorded a very high priority; the effects of cortinued overstretch in terms of turbulence, reduced standard of training and in recruiting need no emphasis here.
8.
Representative Companies. It is intended that when feasible the representative companies, which will be formed from those infantry battalions due for reduction in Phase 2 of the rundown, should be eligible for tours of duty overseas, and to this extent they provide a useful addition to the ORBAT, and will, when available, ease overstretch particularly in Northern Ireland. They will not however make any absolute reduction in the requirement for infantry battalions. Nor can the aggregate of these companies in any sense be equated with a full strength infantry battalion: they lack support weapons and have no HQ structure.
CBF letter 6061 HQBF dated 4 Sep 70
(5) Cos 30th Meeting/70
(6) COS 48/70
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