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THE U.S. WOULD BE GRETLY ENHANCED; AND STICE 42 PER CENT OF HONG
KONG'S EXPORTS GO TO THE U.S., THE BURDEN ON THE COMMUNITY W 'ULD BE
SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED.
3. MOREOVER, WE DO NOT SEE ANY INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE PRESSURE
WE ARE EXERTING ON THE COMMUNITY IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR EARLY AND
FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION OF THEIR INCLUSION OF HONG KONG TIL THE
GPS, AND YOUR ANXIETY THAT THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY SHOULD NOT
BE FIRMED UP TO YOUR DISADVANTAGE. IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING
HONG KONG INCLUDED IN THE GPS, WE WILL HAVE SECURED ONE OF YOUS
IMPORTANT AIMS. IF WE ARE UNSUCCESSFUL, THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE THAT
MUCH LESS LIKELY TO ADMINISTER ANOTHER REBUFF BY INCREASING THE
ILLIBERALITY OF THEIR COMMERCIAL POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG.
4. WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST PRESS ON WITH THE SIX AND AIM TO GET A
FAVOURABLE RESPONSE BEFORE OTHER MAJOR DONORS HAVE A CHANCE T}
DECLARE THEIR FINAL EXCLUSION OF HONG KONG. ONCE THIS HAS HAPPENED
WE SEE NO CHANCE OF REVERSING THEIR DECISION EITHER IN NEGOTIATIONS.
*OR ELSEWHERE. THIS USE OF OUR NEGOTIATING CONFERENCE WITH THE SIX' \S
THE MOST SUITABLE, AND, WE THINK, EFFECTIVE WAY OF SECURING THE COMMUNITY'S AGREEMENT (O INCLUDE HONG KONG IN THE GPS DOES NOT HEAD
THAT WE ARE DEVOTING AWY LESS EFFORT TO THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE
FRONTS. YOU WILL HAVE EEN AWARE FROM RECENT TELEGRAMS FROM
WASHINGTON AND TOKYO THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS FOR HONG KONG'S INCLUSION. IT IS SIMPLY THAT WE SEE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE BEST WAY
IN WHICH WE MAY ACHIEV: WHAT WE BOTH WANT.
5. THE LINKING OF HONG KONG'S INCLUSION IN THE GPS AND OUR
EEC NEGOTIATIONS WAS TIMATED AS LONG AGO AS JUNE WHEN UKDEL EEC (THEIR TELEGRAM NO. 24.) POINTED OUT THAT ANY APPROACH ON G'S COULD
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