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of the other Member States has restrictions directed specifically against
Hong Kong, although some (including Germany) do have a small number of items
restricted on a world-wide basis. The French quotas have been negotiated
bilaterally with Hong Kong year by year. It appears likely that the Community
膏
may move to a common commercial policy in relation to Hong Kong by adopting
a common range of quantitative restrictions: this would involve France in
giving up some of her present restrictions but would also involve other
members introducing new restrictions which would be contrary to their GATT
SAZTEZŐ CSAT
obligations. If this is done, new members of the Community are likely to be
asked to apply the same restrictions, since they will have a general obligat-
ion to adopt the Common Commercial Policy. In addition to such restrictions,
all Member States at present operate some quantitative restrictions on cotton
textiles from Hong Kong. This is, however, part of the wider textile problem
and is dealt with briefly in paragraphs 20-22 below.
18.
Quantitative restrictions post a more serious threat to Hong Kong's
We 368
trade than the absence of preferential tariff treatment. We must therefore Ing Rol
do everything we can to discourage other developed countries from extending
So far as the EEC is concerned and so long as we
the range of restrictions.
1..
are not members, we must resist the introduction by the Community of new
restrictions on Hong Kong goods which are not consistent with GATT rules.
XT
We should point out to the Six that (particularly if Hong Kong is to be
'liable in full to the CET) the imposition of already illegal quantitative
restrictions by the whole of the enlarged Community would be further in
conflict with the provision in Art XXIV of the GATT that the formation of a
(JANIST. i. 1
customs union or free trade areas should not lead to the intensification of
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existing barriers to trade.
Moreover, the EEC, by extending restrictions
without evidence of injury, would be following the protectionist course
from which they (and we) are seeking to dissuade the United States.
We are
A.
bound to recognise, however, that these arguments may not prevail. Hong Kong
joy! cannot for the reasons given in paragraph 24 below effectively threaten
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