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realisation of the aims of the UNCTAD II Preferences Resolution (Resolution 21(II) ); but that they did not fully fulfill the objectives of this resolution and that work should continue on a "dynamic" basis to improve matters in the new review machinery. The donor countries, on the other hand, maintained the view that their schemes fully met the objectives of Resolution 21(II).
13.
These divergent points of view led to a hard fought battle over the wording of the sections on Institutional Arrangements and on Safeguard Mechanisms in the Conclusions. It also led to disagreement on the form of the machinery to carry out future reviews and consultations. The developing countries wanted the Special Committee on Preferences to be empowered to carry on this task with a new mandate. The developed countries, on the other hand, considered that it could be left to the existing Committee on Manufactures. This issue could not be resolved, either in the Committee or in the subsequent meeting of the Board and it was finally agreed that the Special Committee should continue a sort of shadow existence until the 11th Session of the Board in August next year, when the question would be taken up again.
14. Another section which took a great deal of time to resolve was that on Special Measures for the Least Developed. This was largely because of strong pressure from the African Group and other least developed, who considered (almost certainly correctly) that they would obtain little or no benefit from the GPS.
The discussion was, as usual, accompanied by crocodile tears from the more developed of the 77 who, in practice, show no inclination at all to share any of their benefits with the least developed.
15. There is not a great deal to say on Duration and Legal Status. On the latter some of the 77 regretted the fact that the donors insisted on spelling out the legal position so brutally and frankly but in practice they had to go along with it.
16. This left a number of disagreed and incompleted points, in addition to the one on institutional machinery. These were as follows:
(1) Reverse Preferences and Special Preferences
There was considerable pressure on the Americans throughout the Session to give way, or at least to soften their line, on both these questions. At the very end they announced that countries who continued to receive special preferences would not be debarred from the U.S. scheme initially but that, if the share of trade involving special preferences were to increase unduly in any instance, the countries receiving the special preferences in question would be removed from the scheme at a later date. On reverse preferences, on the other hand, the Americans in essence maintained their position despite agonised cries from the EEC's African Associates and the Commonwealth Caribbean. This did not mean, however, that the Americans did not soften their position even on this point. Thus, they let it be known that they were willing to accept even informal assurances that reverse preferences would be phased out by, say, 1975, the process to start by 1973 (which would give the countries affected time to see, e.g. the result of the EEC enlargement negotiations and to benefit from U.S. preferences in the meantime). At one time it looked as though some compromise might be reached along these lines, but in the end the offer was not accepted. The net result is that the section on revers preferences does no more than call for the continuance of
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/consultations