CONFIDENTIAL
UKDEL BRUSSELS TELNO 4 TO HONG KONG
·3.
ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE COMMUNITY OFFER VERY SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE
DIRECTION OF GREATER GENEROSITY, THE GERMANS HAD STARTED BY
PROPOSING A 5 PER CENT ANNUAL GROWTH FIGURE FOR HONG KONG
(THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE 5 PER CENT WHICH THE GERMANS PROPOSED AND THE 12 PER CENT GROWTH WHICH THEY AGREED IN THE HONG KONG/
GERMANY 1979 AGREEMENT IS EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THAT. THE LATTER
RELATES PURELY TO IMPORTS INTO GERMANY, WHEREAS THE FORMER
RELATES TO THE IMPORTS OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY FOR WHICH THE
GERMANS HAVE HAD TO RECOGNISE THAT A NUMBER OF THEIR PARTNERS
WERE NOT PREPARED TO TOLERATE THE SCALE OF INCREASE WHICH THEY
WERE PREPARED TO HAVE FOR THEIR OWN MARKET). HE THOUGHT THAT,
IF HONG KONG REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT 3 PER CENT OFFER,
IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INCREASE IT TO 4 PER CENT, BUT PROBABLY
NOT ANY FURTHER. HE ADDED THAT, NOW THAT THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE
WAS NEGOTIATING IN THIS FIELD, THERE WAS VERY LIMITED SCOPE FOR
ONE MEMBER STATE TO CAUSE ITS VIEWS TO PREVAIL IF THEY WERE OUT OF
THOSE OF
TUNE WITH / THE OTHER MEMBER STATES AND OF THE THE COMMISSION,
IN THIS CASE THE COMMISSION HAD RECEIVED A RATHER IMPRECISE
MANDATE AND THIS IN FACT STRENGTHENED ITS NEGOTIATING HAND
VIS-A-VIS THE MEMBER STATES.
CONFIDENTIAL
15.
}