PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.

do more good than harm. The Governor's answer to this was that it was impossible to explain things in this way to the people of Hong Kong.

5. At this first encounter we did not have much time (perhaps this was just as well) to go into much detail because the Governor had another engagement. He concluded the meeting, however, by saying that we must have another

long and full talk about the situation and that he would

arrange this.

6. The next day (Saturday, 5 September) I had dinner with Mr. Denson and Mr. Howells. Mr. Denson was passing through Hong Kong on his way back to Peking and had already seen

the Governor. He said that the Governor had been most

depressed, particularly about the problems for Hong Kong in connection with our application to join the EEC and "interference in our affairs". Mr. Denson said that he

had touched on the question of the sick prisoners but that when the Governor had said that they were probably better off in rather than out of prison he thought it wise not to mention the issue of exemplary punishment. Mr. Howells

said that he had come to the view that if the Governor

were pushed too far he would get himself into a position in which he would feel he would have to resign.

7.

The following Monday I received a message from the Governor that he would arrange for his meeting with Heads

of Departments on Friday, 11 September, to be as short as

possible and would then like to have a long talk with me after it. The same day I had lunch at the Hong Kong Club with Mr. Clinton, Deputy Colonial Secretary, and Mr. Kidd, Establishment Secretary. Mr. Clinton raised the question of the Secretary of State's letter and I was thus able to

plug a line which I had decided would be the best thing

to do. I told Mr. Clinton that access to overseas

markets was, in my view, the most important factor in the

situation. Opposition to giving Hong Kong the same terms as her competitors was undoubtedly based on Hong Kong's

efficiency in producing goods; at the same time the "sweat shop" image which Hong Kong had acquired, however

unfairly, was a secondary consideration which should not

be ignored. It followed, therefore, that anything we could do to improve Hong Kong's image abroad should be

/ considered.

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