Mr. Carter
Mr.
N.. Stewart.
We spoke. You an
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up para 3 with Mr. Colferill
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HONG KONG CROSS HARBOUR TUNNEL
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We had a word on the telephone about telegram EXCED 49 from Hannam. There is obviously a substantial difference between his forecast (his paragraph 3) of the likely attitude of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank on the question of a guarantee, and the forecast in the Governor's telegram No. 203 of the previous day. I regard the Governor's forecast as much more likely to be correct, since he is in a far better position to know the Bank's attitude. You told me that you had already made this point to ECGD. 2. On the basis of the Governor's telegram I still feel that the question of several guarantees by all shareholders proportionate to their shareholding may prove to be the real stumbling block, if ECGD intend to stick on this. Though the main sponsors of the development project may feel that it would in principle be wrong to let this contract go to a non-British firm, I do not myself believe this consideration would have much weight with the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank, and with Mr. Saunders in particular. While therefore I share your view that it wouldbe wrong for ECGD to make any concession on this point at this stage, I should very much hope that they are already considering whether, should this prove to be the main obstacle, they would be willing to forego a guarantee from the Bank (and in that case also from the Hong Kong Government). I
admit I find it difficult to see any logical reason why the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank should be let off a several guarantee; but
if COFACE are offering attractive terms, and this proves to be a sticking point with the Bank, the Board of Trade and ECGD will then have to decide which they could the more easily forego, the project or the Bank's guarantee.
3.
One point on which I hope we shall very soon be able to give the Governor clarification is the concept of a guarantee limited to the Bank "as a Hong Kong entity". I myself find it hard to under- stand precisely what this implies (and especially what it does not imply, which is what I think interests the Bank most): in particular, what ECGD have said on this subject previously in their telegrams to Hong Kong still leave me in a good deal of confusion
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