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10. Three points are significant. First India would be acutely concerned about the treatment accorded to Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. If they were all included and it were demorated as it would be that the assistance given to them were small India is likely to resign itself with reasonable grace to the fact that the 1955 settlement was immutable.
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Second, India was bound to be anxious about the effect the burden of the pensions take over would have on the Aid Programme and the Indian interest. As the cost of the pensions will be covered by an enhanced and rising aid programme it should be possible to assure India that there would be no deleterious repercussions on its existing or future aid. This assurance ought to mitigate any possible resentment here.
12.
Thirdly, it is the considered ODM view that India would be realistic about the 1955 Agreement and would not in fact seek to re-open it. It would in any case be possible to show that the 1955 bargain was not in retrospect so bad as it would appear.
13.
If the 1955 Agreement can be discounted, the India problem reduces to the remnant British pensions still paid by India of £50,000 and it would be right for these to be taken over by HMG.
PAKISTAN
14.
In view of the proposed settlement of the Indian question the way is now free to admit Pakistan to the field of benefit. There was no point of principle to justify exclusion: the only consideration was the relationship between India and Pakistan and this would not now be significant.
15.
The repercussive problem arising from the inclusion of Pakistan concerns the future payments under the annuity purchased by Pakistan to cover its pensions burden. The rate of payment under the annuity reduces and terminates with the 1997/98 payment of £7,500. Pakistan might seek a capital settlement but presumably Britain can hold to the 1948 annuity terms.
EGYPT
16. It is considered that Egyptian pensions should be excluded because the pensioners were not employed by the Crown, notwithstanding that the special responsibility of HMG towards these pensioners has justified the grant to them of pensions supplements. There may well be pressure for inclusion but it would be imprudent to concede the point before any real evidence of need or justification exists.
SUDAN
17. The similarity between the Sudan situation and the normal colonial position was so close that it is not reasonable to discriminate against Sudan. The grounds which so conclusively qualified the Sudan pensioners for British pension supplements apply with equal force in the take-over context. Sudan must therefore come within the field of HMG responsibility.
FEDERATIONS OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND AND THE WEST INDIES
18. Appendix 6 shows clearly that the Rhodesian Federation pensions are all "post-independence", are covered by the CAP Fund and fall naturally outside the take-over
field.
19.
Appendix 7 shows that there is no need to make fresh substantive arrangements for the TWI pensions.
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