PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
relations, it is a discouraging prospect that in addition to the 200 persons still in prison following the 1967 disturbances, there are a further 37 who might be arrested Jat any time and sentenced, presumably to fairly long terms
of imprisonment stretching even beyond 1974 when the last of the 200 are due for release. There are, as you may know, differing views in Hong Kong about the extent to which it is necessary or desirable to pursue confrontation cases. The matter arose over the case of the headmaster of the Yu Hua Middle School which was the subject of my letter to John Moreton of 6 May. The general considerations set out there, in particular the question of how far "concessions" could be said, in present circumstances, to constitute a threat to confidence, let alone to security, still seem to me to stand. For this reason, I think it would be desirable later this year, after, as we hope, Grey is released, to have a full-scale review of Sino/British relations and to consider what we may look forward to in the light of the Governor's assertion in Hong Kong telegram No. 588 that no further "concessions" are possible. In the meantime, I can only emphasise that to keep alive the hope of securing thereafter the release of other British subjects, we must avoid actions which the Chinese can construe as deliberately going against the policy of de-escalation they consider themselves to be pursuing. At the same time we should, pace the Governor, avoid giving them any signal that the end of the road has come (My telegram No. 440 of 31 July.
4. The final question which I should like to leave for your consideration is really at the root of the other two, namely, what might be termed the "independent Kingdom" mentality of the Governor of Hong Kong. The constitutional position of a Governor quite correctly permits him far wider discretion than a diplomatic representative.
G
Moreover,
for a variety of reasons Hong Kong is in a different position from any other British colonial territory. It is financially self-supporting and economically thriving though its economic interests are not always in line with those of the United Kingdom. Surely in political matters however it
is essential that Hong Kong should be regarded as an element
probably at present the most important element in Sino/British relations and the conduct of affairs there should conduce to the improvement of relations as a whole. The effect of specific executive actions should therefore be weighed in this context and there should be an end to the mentality reflected in the statement in Hong Kong telegram number 588 that the predicament of British subjects "is only connected with Hong Kong in the sense that they are regarded by the Chinese as a useful lever against us". It may be that in the interest of preserving our position in Hong Kong, other aspects of our relations must be sacrificed: securing the release of British subjects, expanding trade and so on. If so, this will have to be accepted and the effects as far as possible mitigated. But the decision should be made after a full and dispassionate appraisal and not forced on us as the result of actions, sometimes taken ad hoc, on which there has been less than adequate consultation between the Governor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and this post.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
15.