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of earlier reports from similar sources of the economic reasons behind
the end to violence by quoting a CHOU En Lai directive "that business
must come first", adding that the communists must merge into the "life of
the Colony" and "conduct business on Hong Kong lines". At about the same
time communist labour officials distributed a tape-recorded speech throughout
their unions which suggested, inter alia, that Hong Kong "was only a small
pawn in the great international game of chess being played by the Grand
Master MAO", and "that small problems (Hong Kong) must be subordinate to
the big ones". Clearly this theme was designed to explain to union rank
and file the 'volte face' in policy and in particular the 'return to work'
tactics then being initiated with the strikers as part of the new policy.
16.
Throughout the summer there was no evidence to suggest the
completion of the comprehensive review of the Hong Kong situation which,
it was reported at the begiraing of the year (Paragraph 13 of
GEN/14/368/16 of 15th January, 1968), was to be conducted by the Peking
authorities. Senior C.P.G. appointed officials in Hong Kong who returned
at the end of January from their extended stay in China, continued to pay
periodic visits there, without any discernible pattern and it was not until
the end of August that it was learnt that the Director of N.C.N.A. Hong Kong
was visiting Feking to make a full report on Hong Kong. He visited China
from 25th August to 20th September, and a number of other senior local
communists were also absent at that time.
17.
The first indication of the extent to which confrontation might be
allowed to die away was received towards the end of September, when, in
another private discussion, a Deputy Director of the N.C.M.A. stated that it
was more important to emphasize the greatness of MAC's Thoughts than to
struggle with the Hong Kong Government, adding that the struggle was becoming
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