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HKK 13/11

Reference..

Lord_Shepherd

I think you would wish to read the most interesting study at No. 1 on this file by the Hong Kong Special Branch of future Communist policy and tactics in the Colony. It strikes us as being a very

balanced and fair and accurate analysis.

2.

In

With reference to the point in Mr. Moreton's

minute of December 17th, my belief is that what

Peking want is to get Hong Kong as nearly as possible

into the position into which they have got Macao.

Macao the Portuguese Administration and administrative

machinery, together with the Governor and Police,

remain in existence, and is the ostensible source of

authority. But in fact the Governor dares not act in

any matter of any significance whatsoever, even in

allowing sentences of the Courts to be carried out,

without the concurrence of a committee of leading

Communists, whom in practice he has to consult on

pretty well everything. Peking no doubt feel that,

if they could get us into an analagous position in

Hong Kong, we would continue to give Hong Kong the

trading rights and privileges with and in Britain

which she enjoys as a British Colony, and by the same

token continue to fight for the retention of Hong Kong's trading rights in and with third countries.

This would enable Hong Kong to continue to provide

Communist China with the enormous economic benefits

which the latter derives from Hong Kong's existence as a British Colony at present, but which would be lost if China were to take over Hong Kong by force, while at the same time Communist China could argue

vis-a-vis the local Communists that there was no need

for any further steps to be taken since in effect the Hong Kong administration dared do nothing contrary to Communist wishes.

3. This was in fact what the Communists were hoping to secure by their campaign of violence in 1967. They failed; but their long term objective remains the

same; only they are now seeking to obtain it by so

extending Communist influence in the Colony that in

any future confrontation the Hong Kong Government would not be able to rely on having the vast mass of the ordinary people on its side in taking the measures

necessary to maintain law and order, but would have to reckon instead on the bulk of public opinion being on the other side. We would indeed have been in a very

much

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