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ANNEX A TO COS 3/69 (Continued
16. In addition, we see a further advantage in Scheme B in that the smaller RAF establishment would place less strain on our overall manning resouces, which seem likely to fall short of requirements in the 70s.
17. We also agree that:
The Hunter squadron should be given the number plate No 209 Squadron.
a.
b.
C.
It should be under the full command of OC RAF Kai Tak.
It would be prudent, if Scheme B were adopted, to have a plan to provide for the emergency reinforcement of the servicing flight in the unlikely event that industrial unrest and civil distrubances should result in a risk of the operational employment of the Hunters being prejudiced.
18. The question of where the costs of the preferred solution should be borne will need to be considered in due course. At the moment the Hong Kong Government pays an annual contribution of £5M towards the cost of the defence of the Colony. The agreement providing for this contribution runs out at the end of March 1971 and a new agreement will have to be negotiated in the course of the next two years although the DOPC at its meeting on 29th May 1968 (4), agreed that consideration of where the costs of the garrison should be borne should be deferred for the time being). It is proposed, however, to establish the Hunter squadron in Hong Kong in March 1970, ie twelve months before the present financial agreement expires, and it may therefore be necessary to settle the question of where the costs of the squadron should lie in advance of the wider discussions on the costs of the Hong Kong garrison as a whole.
Conclusions
19. We conclude that:
Note:
a. Either scheme would achieve the aim.
b.
Costs (excluding capital costs of the aircraft) would be £320,000 for Scheme A; and £335,000 for Scheme 3. The foreign exchange element would amount to £93,000 and £118,000 respectively.
C.
Despite the slightly higher costs, Scheme B would be prefereable since, inter alia, it would make full use of the extensive and efficient resources of HAEC for both first and second line servicing, avoid a split in servicing responsibilities, and require a smaller RAF establishment.
4.
OPD (68) 11th Meeting, Item 1.
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