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I should the
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ur reference: Your reference:
AUS(AS)/F.2
2915
·
CONFIDENTIAL
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.I
Telephone: WHitehall 7022, ext.
27
29th May 1969
Conrad 10 HKK 10/1
t
23
Dear Montan,
Thank you for your letter of 27th May about the proposal to station fighters in Hong Kong. Your letter had been foreshadowed by correspondence we had recently received from CBF Hong Kong and CINCFE, obviously based on approaches at the Hong Kong end. In the time available, I have not been able to consult everybody concerned here as thoroughly as I would have wished, and will not therefore want at this stage to take up an absolutely final position. think I must warn you that none of the various propositions in your letter stand much chance of acceptance.
2.
But I
In the first place, the idea of setting up the unit in about April 1970 is by no means simply a matter of administrative convenience on our part. You will recall that this whole question was provoked by the decisions about withdrawal from the Far East, and, indeed, we are somewhat surprised that the Governor should not have been prepared for the date we have quoted. The key to this issue is the disbandment of No 20 Squadron of Hunters in the Far East under the rundown plan, which is due to take place in February 1970. From that date onwards, there will be no local squadron in the Far East, from which, as hitherto, a detachment has been provided for Hong Kong. The whole idea has been that, as the squadron disbands, we should be able to transfer direct to Hong Kong a flight of fighters, with pilots and personnel drawn from the existing Squadron and with the necessary supporting ground equipment. If we do not synchronize these two operations, then it is going to be very much more difficult and less effective to reform the flight at a later date. By April 1971, we should have no other Hunter squadrons in service, except for one in the Gulf which must remain there until towards the end of the Gulf rundown. We should therefore find it necessary, both operationally and administratively, to build up a fresh unit from scratch, with resources of aircraft, equipment and personnel drawn from wherever they happen to be available, and it would take time to get the unit firmly settled and established, We could not in any circumstances contemplate keeping an element of No 20 Squadron going in Singapore until such time as the Hong Kong Government was ready to accept responsibility. This would not only cost a considerable amount of money, but would also tie down a number of Service personnel and inevitably upset the rundown plan. It would, of course, theoretically be possible to store the aircraft and supporting
J.0. Moreton, Esq, CMG, MC,
Assistant Under-Secretary of State HM Diplomatic Service
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Downing Street
London S.W.1
Cos
Thoms
CONFIDENTIAL
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