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welcome to increase their sales to Hong Kong.
Apart from visible trade Sweden also had substantial invisible earnings from Hong Kong. In any case Sweden's and Hong Kong's basic obligations under the
Baron de Geer said G.A.T.T. were multilateral and not bilateral. that there had also been a large increase in polyester/cotton shirt imports from Hong Kong. Mr. Jordan remarked that this was not substantial on a percentage basis. Baron de Geer replied that it
He was the number of shirts imported from Hong Kong that mattered. stated that that matter was much too serious for such arguments. The Swedish figure was a matter of trade policy and his Government could not agree to any increase beyond the figure suggested, although Sweden could be more generous regarding the other items, e.g. anoraks.
Baron de Geer
117.
Mr. Jordan then asked for details of import licences
Mr. Henriksson issued for imports of South Korean shirts during 1969. replied that the Swedish licensing year was from 1st July 1968 to 30th June 1969. He did not know exactly how many import licences had been issued for imports from South Korea, but it would approximate 600 pieces. Some 225 pieces of shirts covered by those licences reached Sweden in 1968. The Swedish agreement with South Korea was for a restraint level of 210 pieces as from 1st March 1969, but licences approved before that date could still be used. Mr. Jordan pointed out that meant that import licences for approxi- mately 375 pieces of shirts from South Korea which had been approved before 1st March 1969, were still outstanding and could be imported outside the quota of 210. He added that in view of such new information there was no question of discrimination against South Korea. Indeed, whereas Hong Kong was asked for a cut-back, South
The South Korea was permitted to double its 1968 performance. Korean restraint limit of 210 was purely notional. remarked that Sweden had to use the same criteria for South Korea and Hong Kong, which was a 10% cut-back on the 1968 import figures from both countries. If Sweden had not restricted the import of shirts from South Korea they would probably have taken over a large share of the Swedish market occupied by Hong Kong, because South Korean shirts were cheaper than those from Hong Kong. However, once agreement with Hong Kong was reached, Hong Kong manufacturers would have a safe market in Sweden with a level three times as great as that for South Korea. Mr. Jordan replied that this was not necessarily correct, if Sweden had said that export licences for South Korean shirts approved before 1st March 1969 would be debited to the present import level, South Korea would not have agreed. South Korea could now export over 500 shirts to Sweden during 1969 and it was no wonder they agreed to that arrangement. Mr. Jordan added that he had proposed the figure of 700 before he knew of the background to the arrangement with South Korea. He considered that he could now justify a request for a level of 1,200 on the basis of imports from South Korea in 1968 and 1969: Sweden would import twice as many shirts from South Korea in 1969 as in 1968 and therefore the Hong Kong figure should also be double the 1968 level of imports.
118.
Baron de Geer suggested that both teams should take note of each others' positions. He observed that at that time there was no basis for agreement. Mr. Jordan replied that on some items there were no great differences regarding the proposals. The main difficulty was on shirts. Depending on what modifications Sweden was able to agree to after discussing Hong Kong's reaction in Stockholm, it might be possible to complete the consultations by correspondence. If not, they would have to meet again. Baron de Geer remarked that without a compromise it might be difficult to agree by correspondence. Baron de Geer suggested that they tentatively agree to a further meeting in June unless agreement was reached by
/correspondence.
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