0003230
G.F. 323
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33
Embassy on the same date as they sent instructions to the Swedish Consul-General in Hong Kong. Mr. Jordan again referred to the imprecision of the Swedish Note of 27th March 1969 and to the surprise expressed in Hong Kong's reply of 3rd April 1969. He added that Mr. Goldsmith also understood that the request for extension of the current arrangement was in terms of time duration only, and not in' scope.
Baron de Geer replied that Sweden had not added any new non-cotton items; blouses were an item already under existing arrangements i.e. Export Authorisations. If Sweden wished to consult Hong Kong regarding certain items it was obvious that they either wished to transfer some items from Export Authorisation to a restraint agreement or to liberalise them. Furthermore, as the consultations were under Article XXII of the G.A.T.T., there was no requirement in that Article for the purpose of the consultations to be specified beforehand. Mr. Jordan replied that those arguments were based on the assumption that Hong Kong knew what Sweden was secking, which it did not, as the Hong Kong Note of 3rd April still remained unanswered. Baron de Geer replied that he received the Hong Kong Note on 8th April 1969 and had left Stockholm on 18th April. He could not possibly have forwarded the statistics earlier or have replied to the Hong Kong Note. He could only have replied that Sweden was preparing additional statistics. It appeared that Mr. Jordan was only arguing about one week. Mr. Jordan replied that the original Note was dated 27th March and that might mean a roll-back from that date instead of a roll-back from April. The figures under discussion could thus be affected. Based on a roll- back from April, the figure for exports of blouses would make the reference period the calendar year 1968. The Swedish import figure was 536.and the Hong Kong export figure was 662. Baron de Geer - replied that he had noted the figure of 540, which was the Swedish
import figure rounded up.
*
Non-Cotton Garments Table 5 (Polyester/cotton shirts)
115.
Baron de Geer suggested a figure of 558 again based on a roll-back from the date of the Swedish Note of 27th March. Mr. Jordan stated that in Geneva, Sweden dropped its request for restraint even though he had then given an estimate of likely Swedish imports from Hong Kong in 1968 at 646. It was surprising therefore that for the coming year Baron de Geer should have suggested a lower figure. In 1968, Hong Kong exports amounted to 742 while Swedish imports were 622. Swedish production had continued to expand and he would have thought that 700 would be a less unreasonable figure.
116.
Swedish
Baron de Geer replied that Sweden had cut-back South Korea by 10% from its 1968 imports of 236 to 210, and suggested that Hong Kong might also accept à cut-back of 10%. Otherwise, it would be difficult for him to explain to the Swedish Minister and the Unions the fineness of the roll-back system. He had instructions to offer a level of 558 only. He also mentioned that Swedish exports to South Korea were much greater than to Hong Kong. If Sweden discriminated against South Korea on the restraint level, exports to South Korea might be jeoparĉised. Mr. Jordan remarked that it was not unreasonable to suggest that Sweden should give Hong Kong a higher figure since Hong Kong had developed the market, which South Korea only entered in 1968. If it had not been for the upsurge of imports from South Korea, Sweden might not have had to request restraints at all. As regards the levels of trade, Swedish exports to South Korea and to Hong Kong oomprised only a minute portion of Sweden's total exports. Swedish cxporters were
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