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22.
Mr. Jordan then proceeded to examine the individual tables in detail, and Baron de Geer commented that the Swedish Government were concerned with the whole range, ie., by taking the 4 items.it. together they could note the overall trend. Mr. Jordan said that the consideration of each item separately would highlight the items that really needed protection, when bunching together might conceal such necessity. Baron de Geer claimed that such isolation would enable Hong Kong manufacturers to channel trade to unrestricted. products causing undesirable concentration. However, Mr. Jordan commented that there was a limit to demand.
23.
In conclusion, Mr. Jordan said that generally total imports had been steady. Hong Kong improved a lot, but only at the expense of the other suppliers. So long as Hong Kong's improvement were being achieved within steady total imports and so long as the Swedish industry was maintaining its position rather well, there was no ground to claim that damage had been done. Furthermore, he would like the Swedish delegation to know that Hong Kong's shirt prices, especially, had gone up 2 times between 1965 and 1968, while Portugal's and even those of U.K. and Italy had gone down. With Portugal's low prices, Mr. Jordan considered it likely that if Hong Kong shirts were retained on quota, we would be unable to utilise it to the full if Portugal continued to forge ahead.
24.
Mr. Lam, supplementing Mr. Jordan's remarks, made two points. He said that in the first plaće, restraint on Hong Kong alone would only benefit the other external suppliers. In the second place, in any comparison of Hong Kong's prices with those of other suppliers, consideration should be given to the fact that imports from Hong Kong must first of all surmount the Swedish tariff barrier in order to compete, whereas imports from Sweden's E.F.T.A. partners would be entering the country duty free. On a question from Mr. Jordan, Baron de Geer said that the most-favoured-nation rate on imports from Hong Kong was in the order of 15%. Mr. Jordan then pointed out that that altered the entire complexion of the Swedish case.' In Table 1(b), for instance, adding 15% on Hong Kong's price would halve the difference between Hong Kong and Denmark's prices.
Cotton sweaters. pullovers. slipovers, cardigans etc.
25.
The Sub-Committee then moved on to examine Cotton Garments Table 2, with Mr. Strandberg continuing with the presentation of the Swedish figures. At Mr. Jordan's request, Mr. Strandberg examined Table (2)(a) and (2)(b) separately.
26.
Mr. Jordan asked whether there was any explanation which could account for the fluctuating pattern of production. Baron de Geer expressed his belief that the appreciable dip in 1966 might be the result of a flood of Korean acrylic sweaters taking away the cotton market. The Korean imports were subsequently restricted and production responded by going up again. In 1968, Sweden was again threatened with a flood of imports from other sources.
27.
As these cotton sweaters were more a substitute for shirts than for anything else, Mr. Jordan expressed his doubts about ‘the explanation. In Table 2, the 1966 and 1968 decreases in production were not matched by similar decreases in supply. Another point to be taken into consideration was the small percentage of the total imports held by Hong Kong; it was by no means the principal supplier. Baron de Geer's reply was that Hong Kong's increase was the largest Mr. Ho pointed out that in the first two months of 1969, imports from Hong Kong dropped considerably. Mr. Jordan suggested that Hong Kong was being pushed out of the import market by Portugal.
On the
/domestic
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