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as the consultations progressed, both sides might consider setting aside certain meetings at which advisers might be present.
Mr. Sorby commented that as the schedule was flexible, it would be possible to decide at a later stage when industrial advisers could usefully be present at the consultations to consider technical aspects.
3.
Mr. Haerum recalled that the consultations in Oslo had
clarified the points of view of both Governments. The Norwegian Government had started by asking for restraints over a wide range of items, but had substantially reduced the list after the consultations in Oslo and then further reduced it after those in London. He reiterated that his Government's request was most important to Norway in that the Norwegian industry was having difficulties. The industry was fragmentated into a number of small units largely situated in West Norway. What was at issue was its survival. It had to be given the chance and the time to rationalize. His government had prepared further statistics to support their case. He regretted it had not been possible to send these statistics earlier to Hong Kong but he now had them ready.
4.
Mr. Jordan stated that he also had some figures to hand over to the Norwegian side. He did not believe either delegation would want to go over the ground covered in Oslo and in London. He apologised for the change in the composition of the Hong Kong team and explained how it was unavoidable and how it might inadvertently cause him to repeat earlier arguments.
5.
He assured Mr. Haerum that Hong Kong had not ruled out the possibility of reaching agreement even on garments not of cotton, provided the Norwegian side was able to establish that their difficulties were due to imports from Hong Kong. He recalled that, at the consultations held in London, an agreement on cotton items had almost been reached, but still remained to be concluded. As some time had now elapsed, the starting date envisaged in London might have to be. adjusted and, in fact, the latest Hong Kong export statistics raised doubts as to whether there was any need for restraint at all.
6.
He pointed out that the Norwegian Note of 22nd July 1968 included a request for the introduction of Export Authorisations on four, non-cotton items which, the Hong Kong side understood, the Norwegians had been prepared to exclude from the scope of the London talks. No doubt Mr. Hacrum would produce additional material and statistics to support the re-inclusion of these items. It was his understanding also that, at the London talks, the Norwegians had agreed to an E/A scheme for one of the five non-cotton items on which they were now seeking restraint. This would also have to be clarified.
7.
Mr. Jordan then handed over to Mr. Haerum the latest Hong Kong export figures (to the end of July 1968) relating to the items covered by the Norwegian, request. 3
The statistics showed that not only had there not been any spectacular increase but there had in fact been a decline in trade in most of the items under request for restraint. In respect of the items under request for Export Authorisations, there had been slight increases in two items only.
8..
Mr. Haerum, thanking Mr. Jordan for the tables, said that statistics for a period of less than twelve months were difficult to assess because of, seasonal factors. Agreeing, Mr. Jordan replied that, nonetheless, the figures were comparable with those for the same period in the previous year.
19.
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