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As

prolongation and probably both sides would have to meet again. to the date and venue for the next consultation, Mr. Jordan suggested either the end of August or some time in September in Oslo.

American Initiative

7.

Mr. Jerving said that any discussion on this subject was academic. So far, the American initiative remained an idea only and there had been no formal proposal from the U.S. Government. There even seemed to be rather opposing views among the U.S. Administration over this question. He was not sure if it could come off the ground as very often very little would come of election campaign promises. ;

8.

The

U.K. and the

Mr. Jordan viewed the problem with a difference. promise by President Nixon was a price for the support of the Southern States. The question was, therefore, whether the Administration was prepared to press the matter to a conclusion or they would have to explain to the textile industry why that could not be done. It was strange for Mr. Stans to have committed himself so far as the situation was now quite different from the time when the C.T.A. was first formulated. Stans mentioned that two or three countries supported his cause, but he refused to divulge their names. Mr. Jordan understood that Sweden might go along with Stans, but without great enthusiasm. E.E.C. were strongly opposed to that and it appeared to have been a blunder for Stans to have committed himself on a trip to the Far East before he went to Europe. As he had a cool reception in Europe, there was no hope of his getting exporting countries in the Far East to agree.

Stans had some levers with other countries but not with Hong Kong. Whilst he was in Hong Kong he had repeated that although the United States had been able to absorb the volume of imports in 1968, it could not continue to do so in 1969 and 1970. But he assured Hong Kong that he was not seeking a cut-back or standstill on exports from Hong Kong, but was only seeking a moderation of the rate of growth. Hong Kong's view was that the trend of imports reflected demand. There had been a large absolute increase in U.S. production and imports were comparatively small. Therefore restraint of imports could not have much influence and the efficient domestic manufacturers would continue to push out the inefficient ones. Hong Kong suggested to Stans to consider adjustment assistance and tried to draw attention to total market conditions. Hong Kong took the line that where a case of serious injury could be demonstrated, it would agree to consult, but it could not see a case for extending the C.T.A. to all other fibres. The C.T.A. gave importers the power to take unilateral and discriminatory action in the last resort and that was a serious drawback.

9.

Mr. Rønning commented that if there was no international agreement, the big powers could do what they liked. Mr. Jordan said that was why we did not want a C.T.A. type agreement which gave power to importing countries to do as they liked. Article 3 of the C.T.A. allowed importers to introduce discriminatory measures. He said the U.S.A. had never made a market disruption case in cotton textiles. They went for Article 4 arrangements. Mr. Rønning asked what would happen if there was no C.T.A. He thought the concept of orderly expansion was the only way to protect developing countries as some big powers in Europe did not take a share in importing from less developed countries. He

/thought.....

CONFIDENTIAL

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