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matters were not as the Governor had represented them. asked what decisions which were to be taken by Ministers in the near future would actually have a bearing on the Canadian case.
He
19. Mr. Jordan said that Mr. Stewart thought that the Board of Trade should control negotiations by Hong Kong in detail. This was politically impossible and not workable.
20.
Mr. Stelart said that the question was what should be done if an Article XIX type situation cxisted. The question of restraints on non-cottons was important to the U.K. since U.K. imports, which comc mainly from Hong Kong, could be affected. British manufacturers were pressing for restric- tions to be imposed and if Hong Kong conceded restraints to others they would ask for the U.K. to s ok similar restraints. 21. Mr. Jordan said that it was not practicable for the Board of Trade to control negotiations in detail (including even the levels). IIe accepted that restraint agreements with other countrics might establish precedents with respect to the U.K. market, but it was not right for the Board of Trade to attempt to protect Hong Kong from themselves. Hc pointed out that he had asked some months ago for the facts of the U.K. situation.
22. Mr. Stewart explained that pressure of work had delayed the compilation of those facts but in his opinion the U.K. had a better case for restraints against Hong Kong than had Canada.
23. Mr. Dunnett said that as regards the Canadian negotiations and the CTC the simplcst solution might be to agree to voluntary restraint, but they did want to limit the number of voluntary restraint agreements concluded. If they multiplied, the situation would become int olcrablc. The question was at What point would this happen. He referred to the recent decision by Ministers to impose a tariff on cotton textiles
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