}
22.
The following disadvantages would be involved:
(a) By obliging a country such as the United Statca to act, if at all, non-discriminatorily, we would be obliging them to restrict imports from the
U.K. at the same time that they restrain them from
Asiatic countries. At first sight this would directly damage our exports. It may be argued that
the nature of world trade in textiles is such that
if the United States position c.g. in shirts,
measures up to the terms of Article X1X so would
our own situation and we would therefore be equally
able to impose import restrictions. To the extent
that our imports exceed our exporta to restricted
markets we might on balance in terms of trade in toxtiles gain in this situation. Figures given at Annex II show the extent to which this can be
expected to prove valid in various sectors of tex- tiles. However: (1) The situation envisaged amounts to one in which all, or almost developed countries would simultaneously impose restrictions
on imports of certain textiles from low-cost
producers. This would seem likely to be politically explosive,
all
(ii) Compensation would have to
be given by each developed country applying restric- tions. Tho situation would be extremely complicated and wo would be involved in an arduous multilateral
negotiation from which we could not gain any net advantage (see (lii) below).
(111) Even if in terms of trade in textiles the balance was advantageous, when account is taken of the compensation required by Article X1X, it is clear that we would be obliged to lose in other trade whatever we gained in textiles.
(iv) It is true that as it
stands Article X1X leaves to the country concerned the judgment of what constitutes serious injury to its domestic industry, and there is nothing to stop a number of developed countries making this judgment simultaneously. But it would certainly be a radical
departure from the traditional character of Article X1X (which is entitled Energency Action on Particular. Products) and if a tightening up of the conditionu
/of