CONFIDENTIAL
OTTAWA TELEGRAM NO. 57 TO HONG KONG
3.
FREEING COTTON CLOTH AND RESTRICTING SHIRTS WAS TRADING-DOWN NOT, AS
HONG KONG ALWAYS WANTED, TRADING-UP.
(C) I UNDERSTOOD THE CANADIAN SENSITIVITY TOWARDS JAPAN BUT I THOUGHT HONG KONG WOULD NOT BE KEEN TO OFFER RESTRICTION SIMPLY TO HAVE THEIR SHIRTS HANDED TO THE JAPANESE. (TO UNDERLINE MY LACK OF
CONCERN FOR THE JAPANESE I SUGGEST AT ONE TIME, WHEN OUR MEETING HAD RUN ON (AND IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE JAPANESE WERE IN THE ANTE-ROOM) THAT IT WAS PERHAPS WRONG OF US TO KEEP THE REPRESENT- ATIVES OF THE WORLD'S THIRD LARGEST POWER WAITING.)
(D) I HAD SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADVISING HONG KONG.
FOR THIS
I NEEDED TO KNOW THE MEASURE OF THE PROBLEM. MOREOVER, I HAD TO WEIGH UP WHETHER IT WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO OBLIGE THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE PUBLICLY WHETHER IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT FEDERAL OTTAWA COULD PROTECT QUEBEC TEXTILE MILLS OR THAT CANADA WAS REALLY CONCERNED TO HELP DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. (GREY SAID HONG KONG WAS NOT DEVELOPING .) TO UNDERLINE THIS POINT, I SAID TO MACPHERSON LATER ON THE TELEPHONE THAT I DID NOT THINK
THAT DEPT OF FINANCE OFFICIALS COULD FOR MUCH LONGER ATTEMPT TO
SOLVE ON THEIR OWN MAJOR AND INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS.
4. WE LEFT IT THAT THE CANADIANS WOULD SUPPLY MORE FACTS. IT IS A MEASURE OF THEIR CONCERN AND MUDDLE THAT I RECEIVED THEM WITHIN TWO HOURS AND THAT THEY HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN SCRABBLED TOGETHER IN A HURRY. THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM DESCRIBES AND DISCUSSES
THE FACTS.
FCO PSE PASS PRIORITY TO HONG KONG (ROUTINE TO FCO).
SIR C CROWE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED?
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DI STRIBUTION
COMMODITIES D.
H.K.D.
N.A.C.D.