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MESSAGE TO HIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM SUGGESTS A POSSIBLE TEXT. IF IT WERE AGREED TO SEND SUCH A MESSAGE, I WOULD PROPOSE HANDING IT TO MR. ROGERS AND SHOWING HIM THE TEXT. THIS WOULD ENABLE ME TO EXPLAIN THAT OUR CONCERN GOES MUCH WIDER THAN THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE OF TEXTILES AND TO URGE THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS GENERALLY, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO SEE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS NOT COMMITTED TO A LINE OF ACTION FROM WHICH IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO WITHDRAW.
7. THE BEST TIMING WOULD PERHAPS BE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HONG KONG'S REPLY WITH THE OBJECT OF SOFTENING REACTION TO HONG KONG'S IMPLIED REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE COMPREHENSIVE RESTRAINTS AND UNDERLINING THE POSSIBLE WAY OUT SUGGESTED IN THE REPLY.
B
F.C.O. PASS TO HONG KONG AND SAVING TO TOKYO AND UKMIS GENEVA.
MR. FREEMAN.
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISTRIBUTION
H.K.D.
COMMODITIES DEPT.
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION H.K. INTERNATIONAL TRADE.
AMERICAN DEPT.
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