0003230

G.F. 323

CONFIDENTIAL

2

H.K. Representatives

Sir John Cowperthwaite

Mr. D.H. Jordan

Mr. G.C.M. Lupton

Mr. C.P. Haddon-Cave

Mr. David T.K. Wong

Mr. E.P. Ho

Mr. L.W.R. Mills

Mr. Peter K.Y. Tsao

Mr. H.S. Grewal

- Financial Secretary

-

Director of Commerce and Industry

Deputy Economic Secretary

Deputy Financial Secretary

Assistant Economic Secretary

Assistant Director,

Commerce and Industry Department

Assistant Director, Commerce and Industry Department.

- Trade Officer, Commerce

and Industry

Department.

Assistant Secretary, Colonial Secretariat

In attendance

Mr. G.S. Whitehead

Mr. A.F. Maddocks

F.C.O.

Political Adviser

Sir John Cowperthwaite in opening the meeting said that while he welcomed Mr. Stans' visit personally, he could not say the same for Mr. Stans' mission. He then invited Mr. Stans to speak.

2.

Mr. Stans began by stating that he had come neither to negotiate nor deliver ultimatums, but to present the facts about the textile problem in the United States so that Hong Kong could understand the situation and assist in finding a solution which would be mutually satisfying. He said that

he had explained the textile problem faced by the United States to the countries in Europe and Asia that he had visited, and that it had been extensively but somewhat erroneously reported in the press. The problem was basically centred on the woollen and m.m.f. textile sectors where the rapid growth rate of imports had given rise to grave concern. The United States was the only major country in the world with a free open market in textiles, every other country having some kind of restraint on the entry of textiles into their domestic markets, and America could not absorb the entire production of textiles of the developed and developing countrics. Therefore, some method of restraint must be found to enable the U.3. textile industry to adjust and survive. Up to the end of 1968, the volume of textile imports, although substantial, could be absorbed without too much difficulty, but with the current rate of growth in these imports, the levels that would be reached in 1969 and thereafter could not be accepted.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 75Page 76

Share This Page