}
M. H.H. Stewart
Hong Kong Dept-
Higbilly 1/5.
114
1/4
Mr. Stans' Visit to Hong Kong
(119)
My main comments on the draft attached to your minute to Mr. Stewart of April 29 are these:-
RECEIVED IN
R CITRY No.51
- 2 MAY 1969
HKR6/304/1
Para.2(1)
I do not think it is quite good enough in a submission to the President to refer simply to "situations comparable to those which arose with Sweden and Norway in 1968, and Germany and Canada earlier". I think it is essential that the submission should have an amex setting out the significant figures in respect of the cases in which Hong
The Kong has already conceded voluntary restraint. significant figures are (a) consumption, (b) production, (c) Hong Kong Imports and (d) imports from other sources.
If this were done it would be very much easier to assess the "bench mark" theory.
Para 2
I think this paragraph needs to be preceded by a statement of the major issue which arises in the case of Hong Kong. This statement might be along the following lines:-
"Mr. Stana and his party are well aware that as a dependency of the United Kingdon, Hong Kong cannot act as an independent power in the G.A.T.T. and that there is really little point in getting Hong Kong officials to say that they would not mind if a G.A.T.T. conference were called with a view to extending the L.T.A. to cover non-cotton textiles.
"On the other hand, U.S. officials are aware that we have given Hong Kong a free hand in negotiations on cotton textiles under the L.T.A. with some support from our Fabassy in Washington. They probably realise that it would not be possible for Hong Kong to enter into voluntary restraint arrangements outside the cotton textile sector without some sort of approval from the United Kingdom but they may suspect that in the last resort Hong Kong wishes in this respect will normally be ja ranount. They are certain to tell the Hong Kong authorities that they are aware that voluntary restraint arrangements have been entered into covering certain non-cotton textile items with Canada, Germany, Norway and Sweden. They may argue from this that no new principle is involved in extending restraints to Hong Kong exports to the 0.8.A. They may even threaten that unless Hong Kong xxercises such restraints on request Hong Kong will be the loser in the end (because much more enerous restrictions would be imposed upon her sooner or later.
"Although we have acquiesced in the voluntary restraint arrangements mentioned above we have done so reluctantly and have done our best to ensure that such arrangements were only made when the statistical case
The relevant statistics appeared unusually strong.
are annexed to this submission.
"Hong Kong's fear has always been that unless she accepted voluntary restraint, the countries demanding it would act unilaterally and even if we brought the case to the G.A.T.T. on behalf of Hong Kong nothing would
in/
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