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FOR AID TO MANUFACTURERS IN DIFFICULTIES. HE HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IN AN EMERGENCY THE U.S. COULD INVOKE ARTICLE 19 OF THE GATT. STANS DID NOT REACT DIRECTLY TO EITHER SUGGESTION BUT THE JAPANESE REALISE THE DIFFICULTIES OF INVOKING THESE PROVISIONS. 4. SUMA SAID THAT STANS HAD PLACED ALSMOST AS MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS TO U.S. EXPORTS TO JAPAN. HIS APPROACH HAD BEEN SIMILAR TO THE LINE HE HAD TAKEN IN EUROPE ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MORE SPECIFIC WITH THE JAPANESE ON QUOTAS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRICTIONS. SUMA SAID THAT THE JAPANESE SIDE HAD MERELY TAKEN NOTE, POINTING OUT THAT QUOTAS WOULD BE EXPANDED. 5. SUMA ADDED THAT, MUCH TO THEIR SURPRISE THE AMERICANS HAD ALSO PUT A GOOD DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON CAPITAL LIBERALISATION. THE JAPANESE HAD THOUGHT THAT THIS PROBLEM HAD BEEN TAKEN CARE OF BY U.S. JAPANESE DISCUSSIONS LAST AUGUST ALTHOUGH THEY REALISED FROM THE REPORTS RECEIVED FROM THE RECENT JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL MISSION TO THE U.S. HOW VERY STRONGLY THE U.S. BUSINESS WORLD FELT ABOUT JAPANESE RESTRICTIONS ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT. THE AMERICANS HAD DEMANDED LIBERALISATION ACROSS THE BOARD, ALTHOUGH THEIR MAIN ATTACK HAD BEEN ON RESTRICTIONS IN THE FIELD OF MOTOR CARS. THE JAPANESE FOR THEIR PART HAD GIVEN NO NEW UNDERTAKINGS.
6. SUMA POINTED OUT THAT MR. NICHI WAS DUE TO GO TO THE US IN EARLY JUNE AND THAT THERE WAS TO BE A MEETING OF U.S. AND THE
JAPANESE CABINET MINISTERS IN JAPAN IN JULY. THE JAPANESE SIDE DID NOT WANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ON QUOTAS, ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS OR CAPITAL INVESTMENT BEFORE THESE MEETINGS AS OTHERWISE THEY WOULD
HAVE NOTHING TO GIVE ON THESE OCCASIONS.
7. SUMA COMMENTED THAT WHILE THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN REASONABLY
FRIENDLY THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN RATHER EMOTIONAL ON CERTAIN OCCASIONS AND THE JAPANESE RATHER BLUNTER THAN USUAL. STANS HAD
USED NO DIRECT THREATS BUT HAD INDICATED THAT IF THE JAPANESE +/SIDE
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