*
ck ff afito Chackary
201
die briefin For Fuller
wit Nika
et ll
12.18, 0.4
蓄
Liziner)
THE CASE AGAINST "VOLUNTARY" QUOTAS
"Voluntary" quotas usually are controls by foreign governments
on their own exports. There are, of course, variations of this technique
for limiting U. S. imports, but the general pattern is that the U. S.
.convinces a foreign entity to limit its own exports to the U. S. market.
In essence, however, "voluntary" quotas are as harmful as legislated ones
and though their effects may be hidden they nonetheless occur.
The Nixon Administration now proposes to negotiate an extension
of the existing international Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement to cover
both man-made and wool textiles. This will require a difficult negotia-
tion with foreign governments. The very attempt at such a negotiation
will be harmful to the commercial and political interests of the United
States, for these reasons.
1
First, the textile industry has a poor economic case for addi-
tional import protection. Thus the U. S. plans to approach foreign
textile exporting countries with a very weak economic basis for negotia-
-tion (see attached textile industry economic data). Controls on man-made
fiber imports would benefit the giants of the textile industry and the
small group of giant chemical companies which produce the bulk of U. s.
man-made fibers, rather than marginal textile producers who might have
real import problems.
Second, the White House attitude is that wool and man-made fiber
imports are essentially an Asian problem, therefore a question of a
simple negotiation with somewhat "inferior powers. This is not the
??
.case. The European countries account for about 34% of U. S. imports of
The European share has been increasing fast
man-made fiber manufactures.
while the Japanese share has been decreasing. In wool, the United Kingdom
and Italy supply 35% of U. S. imports.