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were not extended beyond the end of 1971. This is because,
if other developed countries continue to restrict imports by
quantitative controls while we rely only on the tariff, the
goods which fail to get into other countries might well be
diverted to us notwithstanding our tariff barrier. On the
other hand, it seems most unlikely that other developed countries
will be ready to give up the system of control which they now
operate under the long term arrangement.
40 In these circumstance, the paper seems to be right in
concluding that, (however reluctantly), we must acquiesce in the
extension of the long term arrangement which in any case we
ourselves need up to the end of 1971. It is also right to
seek to achieve improvements in the arrangement, though this
may be a delicate matter if we have indicated that we think that
the right solution is to dispense with the agreement altogether.
5. The real difficulty arises over the suggestion that at some
appropriate stage, after taking soundings of other @overnments,
we might suggest that a working party should be set up to review
the whole question of securing an acceptable method for
regulating international trade in textiles (both cotton and
non-cotton). Our objective would be to secure agreement to a
system which would make it harder for importing countries to
impose quantitative restraints on imports, whereas other
countries (particularly America) would be wanting arrangements
which would make it easier for importing countries to impose
At the least, they would be unlikely to want to
give up the flexibility of the present arrangements.
restraints.
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}