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such as Article XIX which had not been operated with any uniformity in the past. The objective would be to examine the use of Article XIX and to arrive at agreement on uni- formity of application. He admitted that previous attempts in 1960 and 1965 had not made much progress, but now that the CTA was terminating other countries would be thinking about these issues. Now was the best possible (and possibly the only) opportunity to steer the GATT towards a liberal course although there would no doubt be opposition from developed countries. The question was (i) whether such a general approach was realistic and (ii) what corollary would follow, in the meantime, for Hong Kong. Discussions would go on for months in the GATT. In the meantime could Hong Kong concede voluntary restraints? The more voluntary restraints that were conceded the less chance there would be of agreement to rely on Article XIX. How int ol crable would it be if Hong Kong declined to conclude voluntary restraint arrangements on man made fibres with Canada or Norway? What could Canada do?
26.
Mr. Jones said that he had discussed this with the Canadians. He was sure that they would take action. It was not only a question of Hong Kong Taiwan, Korea,
Singapore (and Japan) must also be considered. Importing countries would find the situation intolerable if Hong Kong refused to exercise restraint when other producers did so. In that situation the other producers would denounce their restraint agreements. The importing countries would then have to take action which they would be able to defend in the GATT. 27. Mr. Jordan said that if Canada proposed a surcharge they would not notify the GATT. Would the U.K. challenge Canada in the GATT? Even if they did, Hong Kong would get no sympathy in the forum. Contracting parties did not want Article XIX more tightly defined. Canada would not be
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