CONFIDENTIAL
12.
The President of the Board of Trade carries a similar responsibility for the United Kingdom's external commercial policy including tariff policy. He would no doubt regard it as his ultimate responsibility to decide whether any territory for which HMG is responsible should be allowed to pursue a course divergent from, and poss bly prejudicial to, HMG's commercial policy objectives.
13. Opposed Ministerial views must ultimately be resolved in
Cabinet.
14. Given a situati on in which it has not been possible after official exchanges to reach agreement with Hong Kong on the resolution of a conflict of interest, the constitutional responsibility for deciding what Hong Kong should do rests primarily
It is considered with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.
that this constitutional fact must determine the way in which such conflicts are resolved, subject of course to the right of the President of the Board of Trade to raise the matter in Cabinet if he considers the issue to be of such importance that he cannot accept the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's decision.
Possible Changes in Existing Arrangements
15. On the assumption that formal devolution of authority (particularly of a far-reaching, autonomous character) is regarded as unnecessary (if not undesirable) and that an acceptable formula can be found for the settlement of conflicts of interest that must arise under existing arrangements, it is necessary to consider whether :-
a) These arrangements for the exercise by Hong Kong in
practice of a measure of authority should be extended and/or improved.
(b) To what extent, short of a formal definition of that
authority, the statement agreed in August may need
amendment.
CONFIDENTIAL
/ 16.