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not be, as the situation of every country in the Community had
to be taken into account. There could then be safeguards
invoked on dozens and dozens of tariff positions.
present offer was, however, a generous one. The average
ceiling was double present imports from LDCs but in some cases it
was three, five or even ten times higher. A common scheme could
lead to different results in different countries and different
applications of safeguards could lead to trade deflections.
Doing away with existing preferences could affect the position of
certain poor African countries, most of whose exports would not
be covered by the generalised system. So special preferences
could not be withdrawn.
He also claimed that reverse preferences
had been "accepted by GATT". In any case each Yaoundé Convention
associate was now free to withdraw preferences given to the
Community if it so wished.
14. The Nordic Countries (de Geer, Sweden) expressed relief at
the news of the U.S. offer and said that there were similarities
in the Nordic and U.S. positions. Their scheme tabled on 1st
March was a good basis for generalised preferences and one of
their main concerns was to arrive at a mutually acceptable common
scheme. In an obvious reference to the EEC position he said that
the Nordic delegations could not accept that a change in position
was neither politically nor technically possible. They were in
favour of giving the maximum information to UNCTAD which should
make it clear to the LDCs that the OECD countries needed more time
to negotiate among themselves.
15. Belgium (Forthomme) intervened next to make it clear that
his government had never accepted the Special Group Report.
The very late tabling of the U.S. offer had made consultations more
difficult. The EEC offer, on the other hand, had been made on
time and he agreed with everything di Martino said in his inter-
vention. He would add that the structure of the EEC offer was not
Most of it was in the first report of the Special Group.
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