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the U.S. delegation in view of the Community's blatant
attempts previously to gain political capital with the LDCs
at the expense of the Americans (see my memorandum under
reference).
4. The U.S. submission envisages zero preferential duties
with no quantitative limitation on all products in Chapters
25 - 99 of the B.N. with the exception of textiles, shoes and
petroleum products. Safeguards would be operated by a standard
escape clause procedure and adjustment assistance.
But the
scheme is based on three premises, namely -
(a) that it will be a common scheme adopted by all major
developed countries,
(b) that existing preferences will be merged into the new
scheme on all products covered by it (e.g. developing
countries still receiving special preferences would
be excluded from preference in the U.S.) and
(c) likewise developing countries still granting reverse
preferences would be excluded from preferences in the
U.S.
The position on beneficiary countries is left open.
5.
Naturally, the EEC were furious at this new development as
not only does it show up their scheme for tariff quotas as being
less forthcoming but it is also designed to put pressure on
all their special preferential arrangements.
(For that matter
the conditions put forward also have the effect of threatening
Commonwealth preference). The EEC's reaction has been that
it is impossible at this stage to alter their scheme and that
attempts to get all major donors to adopt the same scheme will
only lead to unnecessary delays in the introduction of
preferences.
6.
Its
The new Japanese submission was a different affair and it
came as somewhat of an anticlimax when it finally emerged.
genesis was a Japanese conviction that the EEC approach of tariff
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/quotas