REGISTRY No.43
CDK
16
Preferences for Developing Countries
Naithor Mr. Tronize nor I were able to attend the informal meeting in Faria yesterday under the chairmanship of the Secretary- General of 0.E.C.D. (Hr. van Lennep). We were both stuck at Indon Airport all mòrning. The fog provented any flights to Paris.
2. I had a tolophone call this morning from Mr. Scheurer of the O.K.C.D. Secretariat to tell me what had happened. Those present wore -
Greenwald (U.8.A.
3.
Siegrist Kato
De Qocr Horbat
(E.E.C.)
(Japan)
Nordico)
the German Chairman of the Trade
Committee)
According to Scheuror, Greenwald tried to be as conciliatory End forthcoming as possible. Although the United States more attached to the principle that there should be a common scheme of profercnocs, ho thought that much could be done by way of proscatation to show that the similarities between the U.S., British and Nordic offers on the one hand, and the E.E.C. and Jarenose offers on the other, were at least as important as the dafforenooo. The main point of pinilarity was that all thesa offora envisaged the grant of duty-free entry to importa of industrial producta from dovoloping countries.
As he saw it, the main differenco rested in the safeguard Grangemonto. If the E.E.C. genuinely intended to apply quota coilingo only to a small list of pensitive items then there would be do facto unlimited duty-free entry over much of the field. ningrint and Horbot apparently confirmed that this was the intention. Although it had never formally communicated a list of sensitive products, they had ono in their pockets and it covered only some 30/40 tariff headingo.
5.
Herbst and 81egrist asked whether the United States could not make a statement to the affect that they would not invoke any safeguard clause to withdraw preferences after they had bocn given until importa from developing countries had reached an agreed predetermined level. Greenwald did not rise to this bait but Bocorted instood that it would not be the United States intention to invoke any safeguard clauso unless there was evidence that the grant of proforoncos had injured particular U.8. industrico.
6. On the question of existing preferences mjoyed by come developing countries, Groenvald appeared simply to havo ro-emphasi that the United States was not insisting that such preferential trontant should be abolished in respect either of producto not included within the generalised preference arrangements, or of products on the U.8. excaptions list. As duty-free entry was to be the norm, existing proferences would, of courso, have been subnuned within the generalised scheme for those products covered by it.
7.
On roverna proferences, Greenwald caid he recomised that the outcome depended very largely on the developing countries which granted such preferences. He would profer to see this cubject pushed off until the end of the negotiations.
0. On beneficiary countrich, Greenwald said that even though ho was a hook on the Croup of Four which recommended acceptance of the "solf-election principlo" ho no longer believed that it could be applied precisely an the Group of Four had intended.
CONFIDENTIAL
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