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3. The elimination of existing preferences extended by some developing countries to some developed countries continues to be a key element in U.S. consideration of participation in any preference scheme. The United States would not be in a position to give preferences to countries which discriminate against U.S. exports in favor of other developed countries.
4. Any scheme of generalized preferences which may be adopted should achieve equality of treatment for the exports of all developing countries in developed country markets.
5. The United States has reached no judgments regarding beneficiary countries. This question requires further consideration.
6.
Individual countries may, on grounds they consider compelling, decline to accord preferences to a particular country.
7. In the industrial sector, preferences would apply, in general, to all industrial manufactures and semi- manufactures in chapters 25 to 99 of the Brussels Nomenclature. There is attached as Annex A, however, an illustrative list which provides a preliminary indi- cation of major sensitive product categories which may have to be treated in part or in whole in some special way. A certain number of individual products outside these categories might have to be given special treatment. The final identification of sensitive products as well as the character of the treatment to be applied to them will be influenced by the nature of the preference scheme to be adopted, and can only be determined after further international discussion and domestic consideration.
8. With respect to agricultural and fisheries products in chapters 1 to 24 of the Brussels Nomenclature, prefer- ences would apply to a positive list of items. The final identification of the items to be included in the positive list will be influenced by the nature of the preference scheme to be adopted and can only be determined after further international discussion and domestic consideration.
The Competitive Need Approach
1. The objective of this approach is to grant prefer- ential tariff treatment to those developing countries that are not yet able to compete effectively in developed country markets. Its basic premise is that when a developing
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