/17.
previous offers was further evidence that we were more interested
in co-operation with the EEC than with our EFTA partners.
Similarly the United States might choose to argue that we were
making it more difficult for a scheme to be negotiated since the
EEC offers could not be reconciled with those in the United States
and we were increasing the difficulties of the Americans in
obtaining authority from their own Congress to grant preferences.
Conclusions
25.
Nevertheless there are very substantial advantages to be
gained from adopting the EEC's approach. Subject to a certain
amount of adjustment on individual quotas for sensitive products
and to whatever modifications to the formula suit our interests
best, it will be much easier to assure domestic industry and
Commonwealth suppliers that the increased competition they
should expect from generalised preferences will be limited in
amount on those items where it matters and that there is a tangible
and reliable form of safeguard available to restrict such
competition. It is therefore suggested that the departments
concerned should examine these problems in more detail and should
try to reach agreement on the form which a duty quota system
should take that would accord with the U.K.'s interest while not
diverging too strongly from the EEC's proposals. The intention
should be to have the general outline of such a scheme ready in
time for use in 0.E.C.D. soon after the U.S. offers have been
tabled and the O.E.C.D.countries collectively decide to adjust
their initial positions towards a more definitive set of offers.