/3.
U.S. offers when they are eventually tabled will consist of
tariff cuts on manufactures and semi-manufactures on headings
in the Tariff Schedules of the United States broadly comparable
to Chapters 25-99 of the BTN, but with a large number of exceptions
When the next stage of the O.E.C.D. discussions opens once all
the offer lists are on the table, the donor countries will have
to agree a timetable within which they will modify their offers
in the direction of a more definitive statement of the concessions
they are pre ed to make.
5. In adv
modifyir,
U.S.A.
e of that stage, we must face the alternative of
r offers to match more closely those of either the
the EEC. It is hardly feasible to try to align our
offers th those of both the U.S.A. and E.E.C. since they are
likely to be mutually irreconcilable. It would also be very
difficult to adopt some sort of middle or neutral position for
a number of reasons:
a) The evaluation under the burden-sharing
c)
principle of offers based on completely
different hypotheses will be extremely
difficult;
b) therefore it will be extremely difficult to
assure U.K. domestic industries whose products
were the subject of preferences that we were
offering no more than the other major donors;
it would be difficult to hold the line of what
exceptions to make, since if some U.K. industries
were excepted from preferences all the industries
actually or potentially sensitive to imports from
developing countries would have an equally valid
claim;
a)
it would be virtually impossible to assure
Commonwealth developing countries that advantages
/in