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9. I think I should also record here that I managed to
have a fairly long talk with Leary. He said that he
honestly did not know what would emerge from the
deliberations in Washington but thought that some form of
duty quota system, perhaps coupled with competitive need
criteria, was quite well in the running.
I made it clear
to him that Hong Kong did not object to competitive need
provided the criteria were reasonable and were fairly
applied. Hong Kong (and I emphasised Hong Kong) also had
no objection to products being placed on the exceptions
lists. Basically the Hong Kong objection was to
discrimination and I thought this should awaken echoes
in certain old-fashioned American breasts.
10.
Finally, both Miyasaki and two younger members of
the Japanese contingent (names unknown) confirmed to me
their thesis that Korea and Taiwan were more dangerous
than Hong Kong. I said that in that case why didn't they
consider including Hong Kong in some preferences seeing that
Hong Kong was such a good customer for Japanese exports?
They replied that there were "ulder men" whose minds were
slow to change. But the point was made.
11. To conclude, the U.S. and the EEC are clearly the
most important as far as Hong Kong is concerned. I feel
that we should continue to concentrate on them, not only for
this reason but also because if they concede reasonable
treatment most of the others (but not Japan) will probably
fall into line. But we shall have to seriously consider
dragging the Hong Kong issue into the open at the next
meeting of the Ad Hoc Group starting on 13 October, with
/the possibility
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