It
The question of exceptions camint, howevez, be considered in isolation. ikely to be very much influenced by the depth of taxiff cuts, by whether the angemein Cinally agreed provide for some limitation on the volume or value of big role on which special tariff treatment is to be given, and by whether the
diy manba provido for the withdrawal of such treatment on products imported from individual developing countries in particular circumstances,
Death of Tariff Cuts
22.
The Group considered whether they could recommend that the special tàriff
Leonkment silould always take the form of duty free entry which would, from the Polt of view of competing with domestic producers in developed countries, ba the most favourable arrangement for developing countries. There were doubts about whether it was possible to go so far. Given that some products would have to be totally excepted from the grant of special tariff treatment, acceptance of the principle that this treatment, when granted, should invariably take the form of
duty free entry might have the effect of lengthening initial exceptions lists. If it were possible to give reduced duty rather than duty free entry treatment,
some donors might do this for some products which they would otherwise have totally
excepted. On the other hand, those donor countries which might have been prepared in concede duty free treatment for particular products might have difficulty if
another major donor conceded only reduced duty treatment on those products,
23. In those cases in which developed countries already give tariff preferences
to products from certain developing countries, they normally concede duty free
entry. If it were agreed that for some products reduced duty rather than duty free
entry was appropriate, developing country suppliers outside existing preferential
areas would not achieve parity in tariff treatment with those inside them. £4. The Group discussed the possibility of determining the depth of tariff cuts
by formula. One such formula put forward was that duty free treatment should be given where the m.f.n. rate was 10 per cent or less; otherwise the special tariff rate would be 10 percentage points below the ruling m.f.n. rate or, alternatively,
would be one half of the m.f.n. rate.
1
25. The Napth of tariff cut also has implications for the way in which special tariff treatment might eventually be phased out. There were only two basio prssibilities. The first was that at some future point in time all special tariff treatment would end and imports from developing countries would henceforth be