CONFIDENTIAL
quite apart from the serious political implications involved.
G
would even go so far as to regard it as an "unfriendly act".
Indeed, I
Mueller-
Thuns, who took a sympathetic attitude, said that he hoped we would
understand that the attitude being adopted by the Community was certainly
not at the instance of Germany. He confirmed that, at meetings of the
Six on this subject, Germany had been placed in a minority of ene in pressing
for the inclusion of Hong Kong. He added that Germany had similarly been
in a minority over the question of tariff quotas. She would have preferred
the use of more normal exclusions and escape clause provisions in a greater
number of cases and the relegation of tariff quotas tu a supporting role
in certain instances. He confirmed that the Belgians were extremely strong
on keeping out Hong Kong and that they had never really dropped their
adherence to the Brasseur Plan. The French had also come down pretty
strongly in favour of Hong Kong's exclusion. I asked him what the attitude
of the Dutch had been and he said that they had, to all intents and purposes,
gone along with the Belgians and French and had certainly not given any
support to the German position. The Italians had also gone along and
had said very little. (Subsequently, Goldsmith told me that it had been
gathered in London that Wintermans
insc far as he has any real influence,
which is unlikely had been overruled and that Verhagen, in particular,
had put his weight
behind supporting the exclusion of Hong Kong.
6. All this shows that fairly substantial discussions have already taken
place between the Member States without in any way shifting the position
taken up initially by the Commission; and my conclusion is that there may be
little that can now be done to alter the Community's position on this
question, whether by H.M.G. or by ourselves. If this is the case, we
shall have to seriously consider the consequences.
United States
7.
Considering the ease with which American officials usually discuss most
issues, those concerned with the question of preferences have been displaying
considerable reticence in talking about what the U.S. might eventually
concede.
Despite the fact that we had several talks with individual
CONFIDENTIAL
/members