A second reason for the widest possible participation in any new arrangements
is at those developing countries which already have tariff preferences in
~~~ticular developed markets would receive the maximum compensation in terms of
improved access elsewhere in retum for sharing their existing benefits with other developing countries.
Beneficiary Developing Countries
8. The Group consider that the questions of how to establish (and, if necessary, modify) the initial list of beneficiary developing countries, and how to allow for adjustment according to changes in circumstances, are crucial to the whole concept of granting special tariff treatment. They discussed how other international bodies havë distinguished between developing countries and others; how individual developed countries have done so for particular purposes; and how the problem of definition
could theoretically be tackled.
9. The 'Group reached the conclusion that no formula method, such as one based on per capita national income statistics, could be devised which would at the same time
provide an adequate means of differentiation and be politically satisfactory to
Governments.
10. Failing an acceptable formula, the next possibility was a selection procedure.
The questions would then arise of who should do the selecting and how it could be
done in the absence of any objective oriteria to govern the categorization of
Countries. Selection by prospective donor countries, who would in any case be extremely reluctant to undertake such a task, would not be viewed with favour by potential beneficiaries. It was tempting, therefore, to suggest that those countries which on any standards would be included in the developing group should be given the main responsibility for establishing the list of beneficiaries. After full consideration, the Group agreed that this solution should be rejected. They did not think it would be satisfactory that cou.tries which were candidates for but uncertain of "election" to the group of beneficiaries should be obliged to rely on a favourable judgment by countries whose claims to be described as developing were incontestable. The latter group of countries would have an incentive to keep the . list of benefidiaries as short as possible so as to maximize the value to themselves of the grant of special tariff treatment by developed countries. There was a risk that selection might be influenced by political attitudes as well as by economic
considerations.
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