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(a) the Hong Kong economy is showing weakness; or (b) we are under any form of Chinese pressure either
from within or without the Colony.
82.
There are also factors indicating that we should take
the first opportunity that favourable circumstances offer. The growth rate in the Hong Kong economy necessary to provide for a natural rate of population increase of the order of 22-3% and for a steadily improving standard of living may be difficult to maintain, since it is wholly dependent on growing world markets for the Colony's exports. Moreover, as the economic and military strength of China grows, Chinese pressure on the Colony is likely to increase.
83. We consider finally what initiative we may possess in bringing the Chinese to negotiations or an understanding about Hong Kong when the time seems right, bearing in mind that at any time China could make our position in the Colony
impossible and force us to withdraw on their terms. The
initiative would seem to be in our hands only to the extent
that:-
(a) the economic value of Hong Kong might be so
important to China that they would be prepared
to treat with us to preserve this so far as possible after our departure;
(b) the settlement of Hong Kong's future could be
linked with a desire by China for a detente
in its international relations.
H. THE WORST CASE
84. In the event of a Chinese military attack with the object of taking over Hong Kong, present instructions (as embodied in the directive to the Commander, British Forces)
are that military action should be "to offer such resistance
as may be appropriate in the circumstances then prevailing, in accordance with political direction at the time". Earlier directives had been more precise, e.g. requiring the Garrison "to expose any Chinese incursion into the Colony with armed force as an act of aggression". In both cases the intention has been that we would not resist to the bitter end, laying waste to Hong Kong in the process, but
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/would resist